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Infants search for an object hidden by an occluder in the light months later than one hidden by darkness. One explanation attributes this décalage to easier action demands in darkness versus occlusion, whereas another attributes it to easier representation demands in darkness versus occlusion. However, search tasks typically confound these two types of demands. This paper presents a search task that unconfounds them to better address these two explanations of the 'dark advantage'. Objects were hidden by submersion in liquid instead of occlusion with a screen, allowing infants to search with equally simple actions in light versus dark. In Experiment 1, 6-month-olds unexpectedly showed a dark disadvantage by discriminating when an object was hidden in the light but not the dark. Experiment 2 addressed the possibility that representation demands were higher in the dark than the light and showed that infants’ search in the dark increased to match that in the light, but not exceed it. Six-month-olds can thus search for a hidden object both when action demands are simplified and when a non-cohesive substance rather than a cohesive occluder hides the object, supporting aspects of both action-demand and representation-demand explanations of décalage in search behavior.


Infants search for occluded objects reliably by 10 months of age, showing mastery of an important principle of the object concept - that objects exist independently of perception (Piaget, 1954). This developmental milestone sustains constructivist theories proposing that infants lack such knowledge at birth and gradually acquire it through sensori-motor experience with objects (e.g., Cohen, Chaput, & Cashon, 2002). Yet it is difficult to reconcile this universal behavior with findings from alternative methods suggesting some understanding of the object concept much earlier in infancy. For example, when an object is hidden by darkness instead of occlusion, infants search for it reliably between 5 and 7 months (e.g., Clifton, Perris, & McCall, 1999). Even more striking, when infants simply watch occlusion events, their looking patterns suggest sensitivity to hidden objects as early as 2 months (Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1999). This developmental décalage challenges traditional theories of how the object concept is acquired, and has triggered revolutionary changes in the field. For example, a leading alternative to constructivist perspectives is a core knowledge perspective proposing that humans have an innate system of object knowledge allowing infants to represent objects that become occluded (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). Thus, although representing absent objects is a fundamental cognitive ability used on a daily basis, basic questions about its acquisition continue to stir debate.




One possibility is that search in the dark is easier because the action demands are easier. Reaching for an object hidden in the dark requires little more motor skill than reaching for an object visible in the light. In contrast, reaching for an object hidden with an occluder does require more motor skill. Infants may be able to pick up an occluder easily before 8 months, but be unable to coordinate the means-end sequence of removing an occluder in order to obtain the object (Bower & Wishart, 1972). They may thus fail to search because of deficits in planning or executing means-end actions, not because they cannot represent the hidden object (Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black, 1990). Infants’ successes with simpler action tasks and with looking tasks support this interpretation. With tasks that require merely touching the occluder rather than retrieving the object from it, younger infants sometimes discriminate when an object has been occluded. For example, after seeing one object disappear behind an occluder and a different object emerge, 5-month-olds direct their reaching to the occluder more than to the visible object that emerged, suggesting some understanding that an object remained behind the occluder (McCurry, Wilcox, & Woods, 2009). Moreover, in many looking studies which have no action demands, infants show prolonged looking at occlusion events that violate principles of the object concept (for a review, see Baillargeon, Li, Ng, & Yuan, 2009). For example, 5-month-olds look longer when an occluder passes impossibly through the space occupied by the object behind it than when it does not (Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985). Thus, with tasks that do not require means-end skill, infants sometimes show sensitivity to hidden objects before 8 months.




Alternatively, infants may succeed more with darkness than occlusion because the representation demands are easier. Whereas darkness may merely weaken the object representation, the conflicting input from a visible occluder may directly compete with the representation (Munakata, McClelland, Johnson, & Siegler, 1997). Representation of an object that disappears into darkness suffers from lack of visibility (the visibility hypothesis), but representation of an object that disappears by occlusion suffers doubly from lack of visibility plus competition from other objects for attention (the competition hypothesis; Hespos, Gredeback, von Hofsten, & Spelke, 2009). This phenomenon may be analogous to low-energy masking versus object substitution masking in visual masking studies with adults. In comparison with a strong representation of a target followed by no mask, adults may have a weak representation of the target after a low-energy mask (such as an undifferentiated visual field), but no representation of the target after an object mask, because the representation of the object mask substitutes the representation of the target (e.g., Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000). Several lines of evidence from human infants and adults, as well as other species, support the interpretation that darkness facilitates representation maintenance. For example, 3-month-old infants show better haptic discrimination of objects in the dark than the light (Striano & Bushnell, 2005). Adults report more stimulus information and retain it for longer in working memory tasks when pre- and postexposure fields are dark rather than light (Averbach & Sperling, 1961). Amnesiacs’ verbal recall is better after a delay in a dark, quiet room than after an activity-filled delay (Cowan, Beschin, & della Sala, 2004). Pigeons and monkeys are more accurate in delayed matching-to-sample tasks when the delay occurs in darkness rather than light (Grant & Roberts, 1976; Salmon & D’Amato, 1981), and dogs search more accurately for an invisibly-displaced object after a delay in the dark versus the light (Miller, Rayburn-Reeves, & Zentall, 2009). Finally, when the lights are extinguished after an object is presented in monkeys’ visual receptive field, neurons continue to respond as if the object were still visible, but stop responding when monkeys see the object is absent (Graziano, Hu, & Gross, 1997; Murata, Gallese, & Kaseda, 1996). Darkness thus appears to facilitate representation maintenance, whereas an illuminated environment with other visible stimuli may compete with object representations.
Whether the dark advantage can be attributed more to action demands or representation demands has important theoretical implications. Action-demand explanations appear more consistent with core knowledge perspectives. Infants may have an innate system for representing hidden objects that does not depend on experience (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), but be unable to demonstrate such knowledge before 8 months in occlusion tasks because the action demands are too complex. Alternatively, representation-demand explanations of the dark advantage appear more consistent with constructivist perspectives. Infants may gradually learn to represent hidden objects with experience, and occlusion tasks may tap stronger representations than reaching-in-the-dark tasks do (Munakata et al., 1997).

Unconfounding Action Demands and Representation Demands

The source of the dark advantage is difficult to establish from prior studies because most search tasks confound action demands with representation demands. With few exceptions, search for an occluded object requires means-end reaching whereas search in darkness allows straightforward reaching. For the exceptions that do exist, results are mixed. One exception equates action demands by adding means-end demands to reaching in the dark, and shows that the dark advantage disappears. In one study, 8-month-olds needed to open a hinged cover on a box to retrieve an object in both the light and the dark (McCall & Clifton, 1999). Although their means-end behavior was highly similar in the light and the dark, infants did not succeed more in the dark. By contrast, they retrieved the hidden object less often in the dark than the light, and did not discriminate whether an object or no object had actually been hidden behind the cover in the dark (though this discrimination was not tested in the light.) This result supports an action-demand explanation. The dark advantage may have disappeared because, relative to previous studies, the action demands in the dark increased to match those in the light.




This experiment unconfounds action demands and representation demands in a new way. It controls for action demands by equating them in light and dark while simplifying them relative to previous tasks (means-end and predictive reaching tasks). Instead of adding action demands in the dark, they were minimized in the light. To equate reaching demands in the light with those in the dark, objects were hidden in milk. Infants could make a straightforward reach into milk in both the dark and the light. Unlike with predictive reaching tasks, though, infants needed to search for the object while it was hidden. Simplifying action demands in this way changes the relation between the object and its method of disappearance in the light from one of occlusion to one of submersion. Occlusion, darkness, and submersion may place unequal demands on action and representation. Relative to reaching for a visible object, search for an object hidden by occlusion appears high in both action demands and representation demands (loss of visibility plus competition from the occluder). Search for an object hidden by darkness is low in action demands but may be moderate in representation demands (loss of visibility). Search for an object hidden by submersion is likewise low in action demands, but demands on representation are unspecified.
One possibility is that visual input from milk in the light will interfere with infants’ representation of the hidden object to the same degree as visual input from an occluder. The representation may suffer doubly from loss of visibility and competition with other visible stimuli. This possibility is consistent with work showing that other cognitive processes like working memory suffer more in illuminated versus darkened environments (e.g., Salmon & D’Amato, 1981). If any visual input taxes representations of hidden objects, the décalage should persist in this experiment. Alternatively, representing an object that becomes enveloped by milk may be similar to representing one that becomes enveloped by darkness. Because milk is not a distinct object, it may not compete with the representation like a visible occluder does. The representation may suffer only from loss of visibility, not from competition with other visible objects. This possibility is consistent with work showing that infants and adults represent cohesive objects better than non-cohesive substances (Huntley-Fenner, Carey, & Solimando, 2002; vanMarle & Scholl, 2003). If the dark advantage is due to the absence of specific competition from a visible cohesive occluder, rather than general competition from visual input, then the décalage may disappear in this experiment.










	Participants were tested in a room blocked from external light and lit by a 40-watt floor lamp. The apparatus was a table (142L x 29W x 75H cm) containing two plastic wells (50L x 13W x 6D cm) outlined with 1-cm glow-in-the-dark tape (Figure 1.) One well contained 1.4 liters of water and the other 1.4 liters of milk, each heated to 98°F. Objects were placed in the upper left or right corner of each well to control for random reaching into the liquid, which pilot testing showed occurred near the center. Black tape marked the 8 x 9 cm search space in the corners of each well (Figure 2). A piece of Plexiglas (55 x 18 cm) prevented infants from reaching until the experimenter placed the object in the liquid, while allowing infants to watch the object become submerged. An ultraviolet (UV) light was concealed under a low shelf to activate the glow-in-the-dark objects before they were presented to infants in the dark. A sound conditioning machine masked sounds from outside the room.
	Infants sat on the parent’s lap across the table from the experimenter who presented the events, timed them with an earpiece metronome, and operated the lamp with a foot switch. The experimenter wore a purple latex glove to attract infants’ attention to her hand whether she presented an object or no object. Infants wore a yellow T-shirt to prevent their own clothing being soiled by milk. An infrared videocamera recorded the infant from above. It projected to a monitor in an adjoining room, where an observer indicated to the experimenter over an earphone whether infants reached in the dark. The monitor was marked with the rectangular search space indicated by the black tape on the wells.







Figure 1 The four events for participants in Experiment 1’s light and dark groups. Glow-in-the dark tape outlined the wells. On visible trials, either an object or no object was placed in the water. For infants in the dark group, the object remained visible in the water because it glowed in the dark. On hidden trials, either an object or no object was placed in the milk. For infants in the dark group, the light turned off 1 s after the object was placed in the milk. Events in the dark were recorded with infrared light.


      










	The parent completed the consent form and put the yellow shirt on the infant while the experimenter heated the water and milk and put the purple glove on the hand that presented the objects. The procedure began with the floor lamp and concealed UV light on. 

	Darkness familiarization. This phase familiarized both groups with darkness. To keep the infant comfortable in the dark, parents were asked to interact normally with their infant. The experimenter held the glow-in-the-dark duck under the UV light to illuminate it before handing it to the infant. Using the foot switch, the experimenter then turned off the floor lamp for 10 sec. Infants received five trials of darkness with 10-sec inter-trial intervals in the light.

Liquid familiarization. This phase familiarized infants with reaching into liquids. For the light group, water familiarization began with the experimenter holding the Plexiglas between the infant and the well and splashing the water in the center of the well with her gloved hand until the infant fixated it. The experimenter then removed the Plexiglas to allow the infant to reach. Each trial ended when the infant stopped contacting the water for 2 consecutive sec or 10 sec elapsed, whichever occurred first. From this point forward, parents were asked not to interact with the infant during the 10-sec trial, during which time the experimenter averted her gaze from the infant’s face by looking down. Because the experimenter sat directly in front of the well, she could easily judge while looking down where the infant contacted the water. Infants received five water familiarization trials and five milk familiarization trials that were identical except the milk well was used.
For the dark group, familiarization trials were identical to those for the light group except the first trial occurred in the light and the remaining four occurred in the dark. On dark trials, the experimenter turned off the light immediately before removing the Plexiglas, and turned it on when either 10 sec elapsed or the observer indicated the infant stopped contacting the water for 2 sec. 
	
	Practice. This phase established infants’ willingness to reach for visible objects in water. For the light group, the experimenter held the Plexiglas between the infant and the well and presented the object in her gloved hand above the well until the infant fixated it. The experimenter placed the object in the corner of the well, tapped the corner, and removed the Plexiglas. A reach was scored when the infant contacted the water in the search space. Each trial ended when the infant reached or 10 sec elapsed, whichever occurred first. Trials repeated until the infant reached on at least two.
	For the dark group, trials were identical with the following exceptions. Before presenting the object, the experimenter held it under the UV light to illuminate it. The experimenter turned off the light before removing the Plexiglas, and turned it on when either 10 sec elapsed or the observer indicated that the infant contacted the water in the search space, whichever occurred first. The observer judged infants’ behavior for the dark group because the experimenter was unable to judge infants’ behavior in the dark.   
	
	Test. Infants received 16 test trials of four events: visible-object, visible-no object, hidden-object, hidden-no object. For the light group, visible-object trials were identical to practice trials above. Visible-no object trials were identical to visible-object trials except the experimenter presented no object. She held her empty, gloved hand at midline until the infant fixated it. She then made the same action as on object trials of bringing her hand to the corner of the well, inserting it in the water, and tapping the corner before removing the Plexiglas. Hidden-object trials were identical to visible-object trials except the object was placed in milk. Likewise, hidden-no object trials were identical to visible-no object trials except the milk well was used. 
 	For the dark group, visible-object trials were identical to practice trials in the dark. Visible-no object trials were identical to visible-object trials except the experimenter presented no object. Hidden-object trials were identical to visible-object trials except the experimenter placed the object in the milk, and did not first illuminate the object with the UV light (to prevent it from glowing in the milk). Hidden-no object trials were identical to visible-no object trials except the milk well was used.








As expected, main effects showed that infants reached more on visible events (M = 0.62, SE = 0.04) than hidden events (M = 0.38, SE = 0.05), F(1, 29) = 28.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .50, and more on object trials (M = 0.69, SE = 0.04) than no-object trials (M = 0.32, SE = 0.06), F(1, 29) = 59.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .67. An interaction also showed that on visible events, infants discriminated more between object trials (M = 0.91, SE = 0.03) and no-object trials (M = 0.33, SE = 0.07), whereas on hidden events they discriminated relatively less between object trials (M = 0.46, SE = 0.06) and no-object trials (M = 0.30, SE = 0.06), F(1, 29) = 43.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .60.




























Figure 3 Proportion of trials on which infants reached into the search space on visible-object, visible-no object, hidden-object, and hidden-no object trials in Experiment 1’s light and dark groups and Experiment 2’s dark group. (Analyses were conducted on arcsine-transformed proportions, but the figure displays untransformed proportions.) Infants searched more for an object than for no object in all conditions except when objects were hidden in the dark in Experiment 1. 







In contrast to most previous findings, 6-month-olds in this experiment unexpectedly showed a dark disadvantage. They discriminated whether an object was hidden in the light but not whether one was hidden in the dark. This finding contrasts with the hypothesis that if any visual input interferes with the object representation, then the décalage between darkness and occlusion established in other work would extend to a décalage between darkness and submersion in this experiment. It also contrasts with an alternative hypothesis that if darkness and submersion weaken object representations to the same degree, then the décalage would disappear in this experiment, with infants' sensitivity to objects hidden in the light increasing to match their sensitivity to objects hidden in the dark. Instead, infants were surprisingly more sensitive to whether an object was hidden in the light, relative to previous studies. Why? It cannot be due to infants' general tendency to explore less in the dark than the light (e.g., Morgante & Keen, 2008). If darkness resulted in lower baseline activity, then a main effect should have showed less reaching across all trial types in the dark versus light. Yet, on visible events, infants in the dark showed nearly identical discrimination as infants in the light did. 


























As expected, main effects showed that infants reached more on visible events (M = .60, SE = .04) than hidden events (M = 0.37, SE = 0.05), F(1, 26) = 18.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .42, and more on object trials (M = 0.69, SE = 0.04) than no-object trials (M = 0.29, SE = 0.05), F(1, 26) = 73.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .74. An interaction also showed that on visible events, infants discriminated more between object trials (M = 0.89, SE = 0.04) and no-object trials (M = 0.32, SE = 0.06), whereas on hidden events they discriminated relatively less between object trials (M = 0.48, SE = 0.07) and no-object trials (M = 0.26, SE = 0.06), F(1, 26) = 16.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .39.
The critical comparison showed that infants tested in the dark in Experiment 2 discriminated whether an object was hidden in the milk just as well as infants tested in the light in Experiment 1 did (Figure 3). A comparison of Experiment 2’s dark group with Experiment 1’s light group showed a main effect of both groups reaching more for an object than for no object on both visible and hidden events, F(1,26) = 73.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .74. This result and t tests showed that in Experiment 2, infants in the dark in were sensitive to the object’s presence on both visible and hidden trials. On visible events, infants in the dark reached more on object trials (M = 0.87, SE = 0.07) than no-object trials (M = 0.29, SE = 0.08), t(12) = 5.73, p < .001, d = 2.18. On hidden events, infants in the dark also reached more on object trials (M = 0.37, SE = 0.10) than no-object trials (M = 0.21, SE = 0.08), t(12) = 2.30, p < .05, d = 0.45.












First, these findings sustain an action-demand explanation. When action demands were minimized in the light to match those in the dark, no dark advantage occurred at 6 months. Other findings likewise show that when action demands were increased in the dark to match those in the light, no dark advantage occurred at 8 months (McCall & Clifton, 1999). Infants in previous studies may thus have shown a décalage because of a confound resulting in straightforward reaching with darkness but means-end reaching with occlusion. Converging evidence indirectly supports this interpretation. Looking tasks with no action demands suggest sensitivity to hidden objects at 2 to 3 months (Baillargeon et al., 2009), other reaching tasks with minimized action demands show sensitivity at 5 to 6 months (Hespos & Baillargeon, 2006; McCurry et al., 2009), and related work demonstrates gradual increases in means-end skill from 5 to 12 months (Diamond, 1991).




Second, these results uphold a representation-demand explanation. Relative to the strong representation that drives infants' reaching for a visible object, the representation of an object that disappears into darkness or milk appears to suffer from lack of visibility. In support of this visibility hypothesis (e.g., Munakata et al., 1997), 6-month-olds showed better discrimination with visible than hidden events. They reached three times as often when an object was visible in the water than when one was not versus twice as often when an object was hidden in the milk than when one was not. Moreover, representations of objects that disappeared by submersion versus darkness appear to suffer equally from lack of visibility. Infants searched just as well for the submerged object in light versus dark in this task, matching the sensitivity shown in other dark studies (e.g., Shinskey & Munakata, 2003). Finally, the results are consistent with the competition hypothesis that the representation of an object that disappears by occlusion suffers doubly from lack of visibility plus competition from the occluder (e.g., Hespos et al., 2009). Although a systematic comparison of occlusion versus submersion versus darkness is needed to test this explanation more directly, infants' search was not disrupted in this task by submersion into milk, which is not an object, to the same degree that it is disrupted in other tasks with occlusion by another object. Competition appears to be specific to cohesive objects rather than to non-cohesive substances or general visual input. Infants in the light had continuous visual input from the milk and other objects in the room, but no cohesive object came between them and the hidden object to compete with their representation of it. Infants' success at searching in milk in the light thus converges with evidence of success at searching in darkness in other work (e.g. Clifton et al., 1999) but failure at searching with occluders (Piaget, 1954).
	Related work likewise highlights the importance of cohesiveness in object representations. Both human and non-human primates appear to represent cohesive objects differently from non-cohesive substances, and in most comparisons they represent cohesive objects better (with some exceptions in the food domain; e.g., vanMarle, Aw, McCrink, & Santos, 2006 ). For example, 5-month-olds expect an object to penetrate liquid but not another object (Hespos, Ferry, & Rips, 2009), and children as young as 2 generalize novel labels for solids versus non-solids in the same conceptually distinct way as adults (e.g., Imai & Gentner, 1997). Moreover, infants represent rigid cohesive objects across time and occlusion, but not non-cohesive substances such as portions of sand (Huntley-Fenner et al., 2002; Rosenberg & Carey, 2006) - a finding replicated with lemurs (Mahajan, Barnes, Blanco, & Santos, 2009). Adults can likewise track multiple objects that move from one location to another, but not substance-like entities that 'pour' from one location to another (vanMarle & Scholl, 2003). Together these findings support the interpretation that 6-month-olds may represent a cohesive object as persisting after they see it disappear into a non-cohesive substance, whereas the strong representation of a visible cohesive occluder may compete with a weaker representation of the hidden object enough to impair infants' search.

Cognitive Load: Action-Representation Trade-offs

Although the results are consistent both with aspects of an action-demand explanation of the dark advantage and with aspects of a representation-demand explanation, these two types of demands are not mutually exclusive. A third possibility is that such décalage is caused by an interaction in which action-representation trade-offs are minimized in both darkness and submersion relative to occlusion. This explanation is consistent with cognitive-load perspectives of décalage across infants’ and toddlers’ looking and reaching behavior on object representation tasks (e.g., Keen & Berthier, 2004). When action demands are high, fewer resources remain for other cognitive processes, and when cognitive demands are high, infants’ ability to plan and execute actions is compromised (Boudreau & Bushnell, 2000). Occlusion may tax both action and representation more than darkness or submersion taxes either. Infants may search earlier in the dark or in milk because their cognitive resources are less divided among demands for object representation, for action, and for other processes such as attention and working memory (R. Keen, personal communication, January 2008). With occlusion, infants need to simultaneously maintain the object representation, plan and execute the action of removing the occluder to obtain the object, and resist distraction from competing visible objects. With darkness, infants need only to maintain the object representation and plan and execute a straightforward reach toward the object. Likewise with submersion, maintaining the representation of the object while reaching straightforwardly may be less taxing without the added demand of resisting competition from visible objects coming between the infant and the hidden object.
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